There is a debate on whether some forms of financial flows offer better crisis protection than others. Using a large panel of advanced, emerging, and developing countries during , this paper analyzes the behavior of various types of flows:
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The composition of a country's external liabilities-that is, the relative shares of foreign direct investment, portfolio equity, and external debt-may be an important determinant of its economic performance and vulnerability to crisis as a result of two possible types of mechanisms. First, the payments associated with some types of external liabilities have more desirable cyclical properties than those implied by others (Rogoff, 1999; Caballero and Cowan, 2006) : with equity-like forms of finance, such as portfolio equity or foreign direct investment, payments are lower when economic performance is worse, whereas with debt contracts the same coupon payment is envisaged regardless of the state of the economy.
2 Equity finance thus makes it possible for domestic producers to share risk with foreign investors, thereby helping stabilize domestic consumption and improving domestic producers' ability to undertake riskier but more profitable projects.
Second, some forms of flows may behave in a more desirable manner than others. For example, foreign direct investment has traditionally been viewed as more stable, and thus less likely to trigger financial crisis, than portfolio financial flows. At the same time, some empirical studies have cast doubt on the relevance of labels such as "short-term"
and "long-term" flows for the volatility or predictability of financial flows (Claessens and others, 1995) . 2 Moreover, in the event of an exchange rate crisis, foreign currency debt requires even greater payments in domestic currency terms, at a time when output usually declines. On the other hand, default or, for domestic currency debt, inflation, are ways in which the burden of debt can be reduced in bad times. In (continued…) While recognizing that the first mechanism-payments with desirable cyclical properties-is also of key importance, this paper focuses squarely on the second mechanism: the behavior of the various types of financial flows. This paper's objective is to provide the most detailed, comprehensive, and up-to-date exercise analyzing the behavior of various types of financial flows-especially for instances of sudden stops (defined as reversals in total financial flows by more than 5 percentage points of GDP compared with the previous year). Several previous studies have already considered some of the properties of at least some types of international financial flows. This paper will relate its findings to those obtained by other researchers.
The estimates presented below yield a somewhat mixed picture, suggesting that some, but not all, aspects of the conventional wisdom are confirmed by systematic empirical analysis. The key results are the following:
• Consistent with earlier results by Claessens and others (1995) , the various types of financial flows do not seem to differ significantly with regard to persistence, procyclicality, responsiveness to G-7 growth or US interest rates, or comovement across emerging markets.
• Consistent with conventional wisdom, FDI is the least volatile form of financial flows, when taking into account the average size of net or gross flows. At the same time, changes in FDI flows account for a large portion of changes in overall principle, greater procyclicality of payments can also be attained through appropriately designed financial instruments such as growth-indexed bonds (Borensztein and Mauro, 2004) .
flows, reflecting FDI's importance as one of the largest sources of net flows to emerging and developing countries.
• The various types of flows behave very differently during sudden stops. FDI remains remarkably stable and plays essentially no role in sudden stops-an especially striking result considering that FDI represents a large share of total financial flows. Similarly, portfolio equity seems to play a limited role in sudden stops. Portfolio debt does experience a reversal, though it recovers relatively quickly after the sudden stop. Bank lending flows and official flows experience severe drops and often remain depressed for several years after sudden stops.
Differences in the behavior of the various types of flow are primarily accounted for by gross inflows, rather than gross outflows.
A few previous studies have directly analyzed some aspects of the behavior of different types of financial flows, often focusing on important episodes. 3 Claessens and others (1995) , in what is probably the most thorough analysis of stylized facts in this context, fail to find significant differences across types of flows. At the same time, Chuhan and others (1996) and the World Bank (1999) report evidence suggesting that FDI may be more resilient than short-term flows in response to financial disturbances; Sarno and Taylor (1999) find FDI to be more persistent than other types of flows; and Lipsey (2001) 3 Other studies have addressed complementary questions. Fernández-Arias and Hausmann (2001) consider the relationship between the composition of financial flows and the frequency of crises; they find that the share of FDI in total finance is associated with a lower frequency of crisis in developing countries, though they argue that the true underlying determinant of the likelihood of crisis is the currency denomination and maturity of liabilities. Faria and Mauro (2004) analyze the long-run determinants of the composition of countries' external liability structures, and find that institutional quality tends to be positively associated with the share of FDI and, especially, portfolio equity, in total liabilities.
shows that FDI was relatively stable in the crises affecting Latin America in 1982, Mexico in 1994, and East Asia in 1997. This paper updates and builds on such studies to gather a more comprehensive range of stylized facts, including an analysis of the behavior of financial flows in "sudden stop time," using an approach loosely analogous to that taken by event studies. Throughout the analysis, the focus is on net flows, rather than gross flows.
I. DATA DESCRIPTION
Indeed, sudden stops are a concept based on the net financial account, and crises and financing difficulties ultimately result from changes in net flows. Recent papers (Faucette and others, 2005; Rothenberg and Warnock, 2006) have suggested that gross flows provide useful, policy-relevant information, and have asked whether abrupt declines in net inflows are accounted for by the sudden retreat of global investors, or the "sudden flight" of local investors. The standard focus on net flows is retained in this paper both for consistency with the bulk of the literature on sudden stops and in order to investigate the behavior of different types of flow in a broad range of countries, which data constraints render difficult for gross flows. Nevertheless, the analysis of gross flows is potentially fruitful, and results on gross flows are reported where sufficient data are available. It is worth noting that the sudden stop sample used in the present paper-see below-overlaps with Rothenberg and Warnock's (2006) for nine episodes: all of them are classified by Rothenberg and Warnock (2006) as "true sudden stops" rather than "sudden flights."
II. BEHAVIOR OF DIFFERENT TYPES OF FINANCIAL FLOWS
This subsection reports results on simple summary statistics for the various types of flows (FDI, portfolio equity, portfolio debt, flows to the official sector, flows to banks, and flows to other economic agents)-including average net flows, volatility, correlations, persistence, and comovement-for three groups of countries: advanced, emerging, and developing (Table 2 ). Significant differences (at the 10 percent level) between such statistics across country groups are reported in bold, and significant differences across different types of flow (compared with FDI as the benchmark) are denoted by asterisks.
Average Net Flows
Considering the average financial account balance for each country in 1970-2003, and taking the cross-country median within each country group over the period, developing countries had the largest net inflows, followed by emerging markets, and then advanced countries (Table 2 ). This pattern is even more pronounced for FDI, which has not been a net source of finance for advanced countries. By contrast, emerging markets When taking the size of the flows into account, however, the results on differences across flows for emerging markets and developing countries are reversed.
In fact, based on the coefficient of variation, FDI is the most stable of all flows to emerging and developing countries (see also Wei, 2001 ): the (cross-country median) coefficient of variation for FDI is near 1, and is at least twice as large for each of the other types of flows; the difference compared with FDI is statistically significant for other flows to the official sector, other flows to banks, and other flows to the nonbank private sector.
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Correlations Table 2 also reports correlations of financial flows with domestic GDP growth, G7 growth, and U.S. interest rates (the 1-year T-bill rate). 7 The coefficients of correlation between financial flows and these variables turn out to be quite small, except as noted 6 A possible problem with calculating the coefficient of variation is that average net inflows are often quite close to zero. Two alternative measures of relative volatility are used to check robustness: (i) the coefficient of variation for gross financial inflows and (ii) the standard deviation of net flows normalized by the average of gross flows. The conclusions are virtually the same.
below. Financial flows are mildly procyclical (with respect to domestic GDP growth) in emerging market and developing countries (see also Albuquerque and others, 2005) . In developing countries, FDI displays the highest correlation with domestic growth, though the coefficient is still small at 0.2. For emerging markets, most procyclical are other flows to banks and other flows to the non-bank private sector. The only type of flow that exhibits significant correlation with G-7 growth is PEI for the developing countries (0.2).
The U.S. interest rate is correlated with the inflows into advanced countries, with a coefficient of 0.2, and is virtually uncorrelated with the financial account of emerging and developing countries in the whole sample period, though that correlation is large in the 1980s (that is, a period characterized by relatively high interest rates and financing difficulties for emerging and developing countries in the aftermath of the debt crisis).
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FDI is negatively correlated with the U.S. interest rate, in both emerging markets (correlation of -0.3) and developing countries (correlation of -0.2). Other studies, such as Fernández-Arias (1996), suggest-using higher frequency data for shorter time periodsthat foreign interest rates do matter for financial flows. The present exercise finds that correlations with foreign interest rates are lower at the yearly frequency, a result also reported by Broner and Rigobon (forthcoming) .
The results are virtually unchanged using an average of U.S., Japanese, and German interest rates.
8 More generally, note that the paper does not claim, on the basis of these simple correlations, to overturn the conventional wisdom that advanced country investors tend to supply more funds to emerging markets and developing countries when advanced country interest rates are low. The present paper simply reports that the various types of flow do not display significantly different correlations with respect to advanced country interest rates.
In order to investigate the persistence properties of financial flows, autoregressive coefficients were calculated on pooled data for each relevant country group, using a fixed effects regression with the first lag on the right-hand side. 9 The financial account balance is more persistent in advanced countries, with an autoregressive (AR(1)) coefficient of 0.7, higher than it is in emerging markets and developing countries, where the AR (1) coefficient is estimated at 0.5. For advanced countries, the AR (1) 
Principal Components Analysis
This section analyzes the interrelationships of financial flows across income groups using principal components analysis, focusing on the share of variation explained by the first principal component-a standard measure of comovement-for each country group. The purpose here is to use comovement as a gauge for the relative importance of individual country factors versus factors that are common to all countries in a given group. As an example, suppose that the typical international investor treats all emerging markets as a group, but plays closer attention to individual country "fundamentals" in advanced countries. Then the share of variation in capital flows explained by the common factor-the first principal component-would be higher for the emerging market group than for the advanced country group. Alternatively, suppose that portfolio flows are more prone to "contagion" than is FDI. In that case, the first principal component would account for a larger share of variation in portfolio flows than in FDI. Put another way, principal components analysis is a parsimonious way to summarize the degree of comovement among a group of several variables, in this case capital flows to a large group of countries.
Turning to the empirical findings, for total financial flows the patterns across to be affected by "contagion." However, this is consistent with the view that the fundamental determinants of FDI are likely to be correlated across emerging markets, particularly at the annual frequency. On the whole, the data seem to suggest that there are advantage is that it allows for inclusion of countries for which only a short time series is available. The results obtained by performing the exercise country-by-country were similar to those reported here. no pronounced differences across types of flow in the importance of the common component.
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Complementarities or Substitutabilities Among Different Types of Flows?
The correlation matrix among flows (Table 3) permits an assessment of complementarities or substitutabilities across the various kinds of financial flows. 11 Most types of flows are weakly negatively correlated or uncorrelated with each other. This pattern holds for all country groups, and is consistent with the results obtained by Claessens and others (1995) . In a number of instances the correlations are significantly negative in a statistical sense-thus pointing to substitutability across flows. However, the evidence suggests that, from an economic standpoint, the correlations are rather small, as is the degree of substitutability. Moreover, reclassifications (say, between FDI and portfolio equity) may well be frequent and account for some of the observed negative correlations.
To recapitulate the evidence based on the summary statistics reported thus far, equity-like forms of finance seem relatively desirable because the payments they imply tend to be associated with the recipient country's ability to repay. In addition, although the behavior of the various types of financial flow does not differ much in some important respects, FDI flows in particular seem relatively stable (when controlling for the size of the flows). As reported below, FDI flows are also strikingly impervious to sudden stops.
III. BEHAVIOR DURING SUDDEN STOPS IN FINANCIAL FLOWS
This section shows that differences in the behavior of the various types of financial flows become more pronounced during "sudden stop" events.
Defining Sudden Stops in Financial Flows
Definitions of sudden stops generally focus on large and rapid changes in financial flows. 12 The present study defines a sudden stop as a worsening in the financial account balance by more than 5 percentage points of GDP compared with the previous year. (The main results hold using alternative numerical thresholds.)
A key advantage of the definition used in the present study is its simplicity. It should be noted, however, that in a few cases countries maintain a positive financial balance even after a large and rapid worsening. These "sudden slowdowns" in inflows are kept as part of the list of sudden stops because, like other sudden stops, they require a decumulation of reserves or a reduction in the current account deficit. Another potential caveat is that in principle some sudden stops in financial inflows may be viewed primarily as the mirror image of improvements in the current account balanceespecially windfall gains in exports revenues resulting from booms in commodity prices.
Although the sample includes commodity exporters, none of the sudden stops analyzed seem to meet this description.
Alternative definitions of sudden stops are possible: for example, a decline in flows by more than two standard deviations, based on the individual country's distribution (Calvo, Izquierdo, and Mejia, 2004) . Other things equal, however, a threshold based on percentage points of GDP will tend to identify more episodes in countries with volatile financial flows, whereas a threshold based on standard deviations will tend to identify a considerable number of episodes even for countries whose flows are stable by international standards. In an attempt to alleviate this problem, some studies use a combination of criteria, such as the 5 percentage point of GDP cutoff in combination with the change being greater than one standard deviation (Guidotti, Sturzenegger, and Villar, 2004) . While such definitions are reasonable, this paper uses the simpler definition outlined above. The results are robust to changes in the sudden stop definition.
More generally, regardless of the exact definition, the interpretation of the results will depend on the direction of causality. Arguably, an intuitive and interesting question is which types of financial flows account for a sudden stop prompted by an exogenous fall in the supply to emerging markets, rather than a sudden stop caused by worsening expectations regarding a country's economic performance. While causality cannot be established definitively, inspection of growth forecast data since 1990 suggests that this paper's list of sudden stops does not include any obvious instances in which the stop was triggered by worsening growth expectations-as shown below.
Behavior of Different Types of Financial Flows Around Sudden Stops
The various types of financial flows display striking differences in behavior in FDI plays almost no role in sudden stops in financial flows: it remains strikingly stable, even though it represents a large share of total financial flows. 13 Similarly, portfolio equity seems to play a limited role in sudden stops. Portfolio debt does experience a reversal, though-on average-it recovers relatively quickly after sudden stops. Other flows to the official sector, banks, and especially the non-bank private sector experience severe drops, and remain depressed for a few years after sudden stops. These differences are statistically significant. The drops in FDI and PEI during the year of the sudden stop are significantly smaller than the drops in PDI, other flows to banks and other flows to the non-bank private sector. Indeed, whereas the drops in FDI or PEI are not statistically different from zero, the drops in all of the other categories are significant.
One might wonder whether the patterns displayed in Figure 1 vary depending on country characteristics such as the exchange rate regime or the degree of capital controls.
For example, it is interesting to ask whether floating exchange rates might reduce the likelihood of excessive inflows that might subsequently be reversed in a sudden stop.
Similarly, capital controls might tend to stabilize some types of flows more effectively than others. To address these issues, the sample was split into countries with fixed exchange rate regimes and those with flexible exchange rates. 14 The results (available upon request) show remarkably similar patterns for these two groups of countries. For capital controls, too few of the countries in the "sudden stop" sample had relatively liberal financial accounts to make a reliable comparison.
Replicating the analysis in Figure 1 for gross inflows and gross outflows (analogous charts are available from the authors upon request) shows that the results for gross inflows are strikingly similar to those reported in Figure 1 , whereas the results for gross outflows show far more limited action. In other words, the patterns displayed in the figure are accounted for by differences in the behavior of gross inflows, whereas gross outflows do not seem to play an important role in this respect. Thus, in the terminology of Faucette and others (2005) and Rothenberg and Warnock (2006) , this paper's sample seems to consist primarily of "true sudden stops" rather than "sudden flights," and such sudden stops are mainly accounted for by non-FDI inflows.
13 Section II.C discusses whether this result could be accounted for by "fire-sale FDI" (namely, FDI taking place in the aftermath of a crisis as cash-strapped domestic entrepreneurs sell to foreign investors who take advantage of the exchange rate devaluation).
14 Fixed exchange rate regimes were those classified as 4 and above according to Reinhart and Rogoff's (2004) "fine" classification, supplemented by information drawn from the IMF's Annual Report on Exchange Arrangement and Exchange Restrictions.
An alternative way of gauging the role played by each type of (net) flow in sudden stops is to consider the number of instances in which a type of flow worsened by more than a given threshold (say, in percentage points of GDP) during sudden stop episodes (Table 4) . Considering the 85 sudden stops for which data on some type of flow are available (top panel) and the 33 sudden stops (as in Figure 1 ) for which data on all types of flow are available (bottom panel) confirms that FDI plays a limited role in sudden stops, whereas "other flows" display more frequent large worsenings.
Additionally, portfolio debt displays relatively frequent large drops, especially taking into consideration its relatively small size in normal times.
A similar message emerges when considering the response of different components of financial flows at the quarterly frequency around the Russian/LTCM crisis of August 1998, for all emerging market countries (see Figure 2 , which-for the sake of brevity-only reports data for the countries whose financial account balance was most affected by the crisis.) Again, FDI (the dotted line) remains remarkably stable in all countries, despite major worsening of the financial account balance (the solid line) and net flows of portfolio debt, portfolio equity, and other flows. The advantages of analyzing the Russian/LTCM crisis and its aftermath are that it may be viewed as a genuinely exogenous "sudden stops" (an unexpected event, unlikely to have been triggered by simultaneously worsening expectations of growth or other fundamentals in many emerging markets); and that its consequences may be tracked for all emerging markets, without imposing any numerical cutoff on the size of the financial account reversal. At the same time, a disadvantage is that the initial nature of the shock, a default on debt contracts, may have made it more likely to affect portfolio debt than other types of liabilities.
Interpretation
Causality and Timing
As mentioned above, the interpretation of the results regarding which components of financial flows account for sudden stops depends on the ultimate source of the sudden stop itself. If the sudden stop were driven by worsening expectations of economic growth, and if some types of flows were more closely related to growth prospects than others, then differences in resilience across types of flow in the face of sudden stops would arise naturally. If, instead, it were difficult to attribute sudden stops to changes in fundamentals in the countries affected, then one might be more willing to view some types of flows as more prone to reversals, regardless of the ultimate source of the shock.
While causality cannot be conclusively established, this section shows that, for most sudden stop episodes in the sample, there is no evidence that sudden stops were preceded by a worsening of expectations regarding economic growth. Beginning from the 33 sudden stop episodes listed in Figure 1 , the analysis includes all 16 sudden stops for which monthly Consensus Forecasts of economic growth are available. Specifically, for each month of the year in which the sudden stop occurs, the Consensus Forecast of economic growth for the following year is considered. This is taken to be a reliable, summary measure of investors' expectations regarding economic "fundamentals" and prospects in the country in question.
As shown in Figure 3 , for all sudden stop episodes, expectations of economic growth were buoyant or at least fairly positive at the beginning of the year in which the sudden stop eventually occurred. Thus, a few months ahead of the sudden stop, expectations regarding economic "fundamentals" were strong. In general, it seems that expectations regarding economic fundamentals typically evolve in a gradual manner, and are unlikely to plummet abruptly in the absence of a shock-which seems to take the form of a sudden stop in financial flows in the cases depicted in the Figure. The monthly profile of how the forecasts change during the year of the sudden stop is also consistent with the view that the sudden stop triggered the decline in forecast growth, rather than the other way around. In most cases where-based on information about financial flows or asset prices-the onset of the sudden stop in capital flows can be dated, there was no worsening in expected growth prior to the month when the sudden stop began. 15 Indeed, in most cases where the sudden stop was associated with an abrupt crisis reflected in the exchange rate or other asset prices, the Consensus Forecast growth began falling in a visible manner no earlier than the month during which the crisis erupted ( Figure 3) . In several cases, forecast growth declined only months after the exchange rate or other asset prices dropped. where it is difficult to associate the sudden stop with an easy-to-date crisis (Croatia, Czech Republic, Lithuania, Panama, Venezuela), growth expectations remain strong throughout the year of the sudden stop, except in the case of Venezuela, where forecast growth was about 2 percent at the beginning of the year of the sudden stop and declined rapidly during the year. On the whole, based on the patterns observed in the data it appears unlikely that sudden stops were caused by worsening country-specific fundamentals (with the notable exception of Argentina).
Fire-Sale FDI
Another potential concern is that perhaps a large portion of the resilience of FDI in the face of sudden stops might be accounted for by an increase in "fire-sale" FDI-a phenomenon for which existing evidence is based upon firm-level data regressions for a small set of Asian countries in the context of the 1997-98 crisis (Aguiar and Gopinath, 2005) . 16 While it is difficult to gauge the exact macroeconomic relevance of fire-sale FDI, two sets of considerations are in order here. First, FDI rose after sudden stops in two Asian countries, Korea and Thailand, where growth expectations improved rapidly soon after the crisis. In essentially all other cases in the sample, FDI remained strikingly stable.
Occam's razor suggests that it would be unlikely for fire-sale FDI to match any decline in FDI so as to yield such exact stability in so many countries. Thus, it is an open question whether fire-sale FDI is a phenomenon of macroeconomic relevance in countries other than Korea and Thailand. Second, and more important, one might wonder whether FDI is failing to provide protection from sudden stops when domestic agents take a capital loss and then sell FDI (in a fire-sale) to foreign investors, who buy cheap assets in the aftermath of the crisis. Although it is true that domestic agents incur a capital loss in this case, a similar loss affects foreign investors who held FDI prior to the crisis. Moreover, as stated in the introduction, this paper focuses on the behavior of various types of flow, leaving the cyclical pattern of returns on the resulting stocks as a topic for further investigation.
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND POSSIBLE EXTENSIONS
There has been considerable interest in the question of whether some forms of external financing help protect emerging markets from volatility and, in particular, render sudden Barbados (1992 Barbados ( , 2002 Brazil (1983); Chile (1991); Cote d'Ivoire (1983 , 1996 , Croatia (1998); Czech Republic (1996); Estonia (1998); Korea, Rep. (1997); Latvia (2000) ; Lithuania (1999); Mauritius (2001); Mexico (1995); Namibia (1991 Namibia ( , 1999 Panama (2000) ; Peru (1998); Philippines (1997); Russian Federation (1998); Senegal (1982); Slovenia (1998); Swaziland (1993); Thailand (1982 Thailand ( , 1997 Togo (1992); Turkey (1994 Turkey ( , 2001 ; Ukraine (1998); and Venezuela (1980 and Venezuela ( , 1989 and Venezuela ( , 2002 . For each type of capital flow, the entire available sample of countries and years is first regressed on a full set of country and year fixed effects to remove country-specific means and global developments from the data. All flows exclude Exceptional Financing, Use of IMF credit, and changes in reserves. Source: Consensus Forecasts . The data reported are medians across countries within each group. All flows are net and normalized by total GDP for each year. Stars indicate that the flow is statistically significant from FDI in that country group. Columns in bold are those in which the property of the flows is different across country groups. The coefficient of variation of a series is the standard deviation divided by the mean: it is computed for each country separately, and this table reports the median across countries. The measure of persistence for each variable is the slope coefficient in a panel (fixed effects) regression of the variable of interest on its lagged value. The share of variation accounted for by the first principal component is a measure of comovement across countries within each group: it is the share of total variation in a set of series that can be explained by a common component. The table considers sudden stops defined as episodes when the financial account worsens by more than 5 percentage points of GDP. The top panel considers the 85 sudden stops for which data are available for some type of flow. The bottom panel considers the 33 sudden stops for which data are available for all types of flow. Within these sudden stop episodes defined as above, the table reports the number of instances in which each flow type fell by more than a given number of percentage points of GDP, as indicated. Thus, there will often be instances in which more than one type of investment falls by more than the indicated benchmark. For the sake of brevity, this table aggregates "flows to official," "flows to banks," and "flows to other" from the previous figures and tables into "other investments."
